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In this paper, we analyze a variety of data on saving motives, bequest
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and the United States,” a binational survey conducted in 1996 by the Institute
for Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications of the Government of Japan, in order to shed light on which
model of household behavior applies in the two countries.  We find (1) that
the selfish life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in
both countries but that it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the
U.S., (2) that the altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it
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1I. Introduction
       An issue of critical importance for economists and policymakers alike is
which model of household behavior (the life cycle model of Modigliani and
Brumberg (1954), the altruism model of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981),
the dynasty model of Weil (1989), etc.) is more applicable in the real world,
and data on the saving and bequest motives of households can shed considerable
light on this important issue because the various models have very different
implications for saving and bequest motives.  In this paper, we analyze a
variety of data on saving and bequest motives in the United States and Japan
from the "Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan and the United States
(Chochiku ni kansuru Nichibei Hikaku Chousa)" (hereafter the "U.S.-Japan
Survey"), conducted in 1996 by the Institute for Posts and Telecommunications
Policy (IPTP) of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the
Government of Japan, in order to shed light on which of the aforementioned
models of household behavior applies in the U.S. and Japan.
There have been a number of previous studies that test for the validity
of the various models in individual countries (for example, Bernheim, Shleifer,
and Summers (1985), Cox (1987), Hurd (1987), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff
(1989) for the U.S. and Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), and Hayashi
(1995) for Japan--see Horioka (1993) for a survey of the literature on Japan),
but these studies are confined to individual countries and make inferences
based on the actual behavior of individuals or households.  To the best of our
knowledge, the present study is unique in at least two respects: first,
because it compares the extent to which the various models apply in the U.S.
and Japan, and second, because it makes inferences based on direct information
on the attitudes of respondents.
Conducting a U.S.-Japan comparison is a meaningful exercise for at least
2three reasons--first, because it might shed light on why Japan’s saving rate
is so much higher than that of the U.S.; second, because there are important
cultural differences between the two countries, and to the extent that
cultural differences are important, we would expect different models of
household behavior to apply in the two countries; and third, because the U.S.
and Japan are by far the two largest economies in the world.
Our paper is organized as follows: we discuss theoretical considerations
in section II, describe the data source in section III, and conduct a U.S.-
Japan comparison of saving motives in section IV and a U.S.-Japan comparison
of bequests, bequest motives, and attitudes toward bequest division in section
V.  Section VI is a brief concluding section.
To preview the main findings of our paper, our U.S.-Japan comparison of
saving and bequest motives suggests (1) that the selfish life cycle model is
the dominant model of household behavior in both the U.S. and Japan but that
it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S., (2) that the
altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan but that
it is not the dominant model of household behavior in either country, and (3)
that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. but
that it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.
II. Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we briefly describe the three models of household
behavior we will be considering and discuss the implications of these three
models for saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division.
A. The Life Cycle Model
The purest form of the life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg
3(1954) assumes that individuals are selfish and do not care about their
children or about anyone else.  Thus, if this model is valid, households
should be saving primarily for retirement and other life cycle motives (i.e.,
motives arising from differences in timing between income and expenditure
streams over the course of their own lifetimes) and/or for precautionary
motives (which are also consistent with the life cycle model), any bequests
they leave should be unintended bequests arising from longevity risk or
intended bequests motivated by selfish considerations such as a strategic
bequest motive à la Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) or an implicit
intra-family annuity contract à la Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), and bequests
should be left only to children who provide something in return such as care
and/or financial assistance during old age.
B. The Altruism Model
The altruism model assumes that households harbor intergenerational
altruism (altruism toward their own children), and thus if this model is valid,
households should be saving not only for life cycle motives but also in order
to leave a bequest, their bequests should be motivated by intergenerational
altruism, and their bequests should be compensatory in the sense that more is
left to children with less earning capacity and/or greater needs.
C. The Dynasty Model
The dynasty model assumes that households wish to perpetuate their
family line (dynasty) or family business, and thus if this model is valid,
households should be saving not only for life cycle motives but also in order
to leave a bequest, their bequests should be motivated by dynastic
considerations, and their bequests should be divided unequally, with the
4entire bequest being left to the first-born child or to the child who carries
on the family line or the family business.1    
Thus, the three models of household behavior have very different
implications concerning saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division,
and data on saving motives, bequest motives, and bequest division should be
able to shed considerable light on which model of household behavior is
applicable in the real world.
III. The Data Source
In this section, we discuss the “Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan
and the United States,” the data source used for this analysis, in greater
detail.  This survey was conducted roughly simultaneously in the U.S. and
Japan using identical questionnaires.  The U.S. survey was conducted during
the February 9-March 6, 1996, period by National Family Opinion, a private
polling organization.  2,200 households were selected from among the 40,000
households already participating in this company's National Household Panel
and asked to participate in this survey.  Care was taken to ensure that the
resulting sample was representative of the total population.  These households
were mailed questionnaires and were asked to mail them back; those not
returning their questionnaires were sent one reminder.  This resulted in 1,508
responses, a response rate of 68.5%.  The Japanese survey was conducted during
the January 31-February 16, 1996, period by Nippon Research Center, a private
polling organization.  1,800 households were selected by a stratified random
sampling procedure, and questionnaires were delivered in person to, and
collected in person from, these households.  This resulted in 1,243 responses,
a response rate of 69.1%.2
5The target population in both countries was all households (including
single-person households) with a head aged 20 or older.  The geographic
coverage was as follows: cities in the 48 contiguous states plus the District
of Columbia in the case of the U.S. and three large cities (cities with a
population of 1,000,000 or more), five medium-sized cities (cities with a
population of 500,000 to 600,000), and four small cities (cities with a
population of less than 200,000) in the case of Japan.
The survey includes a variety of questions not only about the
respondents’ behavior but also about their attitudes toward saving, bequests,
etc., and to the best of our knowledge, it is the first such survey to be
conducted simultaneously in the U.S. and Japan and one of the first such
surveys to be conducted in the U.S.3
IV. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Saving Motives
In this section, we present data from the U.S.-Japan Survey on saving
motives.  In particular, we estimate the amount of saving for each of thirteen
motives in order to determine how much saving for each motive contributes to
overall household saving in the U.S. and Japan (see Horioka, Yokota, Miyaji,
and Kasuga (1997) and Horioka and Watanabe (1997, 1998) for a similar analysis
using Japanese data only).
A. Theoretical Considerations
Before presenting our results, we wish to discuss some theoretical
considerations.  It is important to bear in mind that, at any given point in
time, there are households saving for any given motive as well as households
dissaving for that motive. For example, at any given time, there are young
(pre-retirement) households that are saving for retirement as well as aged
6(post-retirement) households that are dissaving for retirement.  What
contributes to overall household saving is the amount by which the saving of
those saving for a given motive (hereafter called "gross saving") exceeds the
dissaving of those dissaving for that motive.  We will hereafter refer to this
difference as "net saving."  The amount of net saving for any given motive can
be either positive, zero, or negative depending on the relative magnitudes of
gross saving and dissaving for that motive, and it will not necessarily be
large or even positive no matter how large gross saving for that motive is.
Gross saving for a given motive consists of the saving in the form of
the accumulation of financial assets of those planning to realize that motive
in the future and the saving in the form of loan repayments of those realizing
that motive in the past (the repayment of principal is a form of saving
because it increases the household's net worth).  Similarly, dissaving for a
given motive consists of the dissaving in the form of the decumulation of
financial assets and the dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt of those
realizing that motive during the current period.  In the case of motives
involving investment in depreciable fixed assets such as housing, consumer
durables, and plant and equipment, dissaving in the form of the decumulation
of financial assets and that in the form of newly incurred debt will be
precisely offset by saving in the form of investment in such assets, but
dissaving will still occur in the form of the depreciation on such assets of
those realizing such motives in the past.4
B. The Calculation Method
Fortunately, the U.S.-Japan Survey collects the information needed to
calculate the various components of gross saving and dissaving for each of
thirteen motives:  "in order to save up for life after retirement" (hereafter
7the "retirement motive"), "in order to provide extra living expenses"
(hereafter the "living expenses motive"), "for unexpected expenses required by
illness, disaster, etc." (hereafter the "illness motive"), "for one's
children's education" (hereafter the "education motive"), "for one's
children's marriage" (hereafter the "marriage motive"), "to purchase one's own
home (and land) (including rebuilding and upgrading)" (hereafter the "housing
motive"), "for the purchase of durable goods" (hereafter the "consumer
durables motive"), "for leisure" (hereafter the "leisure motive"), "to pay
taxes" (hereafter the "tax motive"), "to start up one's own business"
(hereafter the "business motive"), "saving not for any specific purpose but
for the sake of peace of mind" (hereafter the "peace of mind motive"), "to
leave as a bequest" (hereafter the "bequest motive"), and "other."
Direct information is collected on the accumulation and decumulation of
financial assets and on newly incurred debt and loan repayments for each
motive.  The only exceptions are that information is not collected on loan
repayments and newly incurred debt for the retirement, tax, business, peace of
mind, and bequest motives in both countries and that information is not
collected on the accumulation of financial assets for the living expenses
motive or on the decumulation of financial assets for the retirement and peace
of mind motives in the case of Japan only.  Dissaving for the living expenses
motive in the form of the decumulation of financial assets is regarded as
being for the peace of mind motive in the case of those aged 59 or younger and
for the retirement motive in the case of those aged 60 or older, while saving
in the form of loan repayments and dissaving in the form of newly incurred
debt for the living expenses motive is regarded as being for the peace of mind
motive, regardless of the age of the respondent. 5 6
       Turning to dissaving in the form of depreciation on owner-occupied
8housing, direct information is not collected thereon, but it can be calculated
by multiplying the market value of owner-occupied housing (the structure only)
by an appropriate depreciation rate.  The most recent housing censuses in the
U.S. and Japan (the 1993 American Housing Survey in the U.S. and the 1993
Housing Survey in Japan) found that the median age of owner-occupied housing
in the two countries is 27 and 17 years, respectively, and we assumed that the
useful life of owner-occupied housing in the two countries is twice the median
age--54 and 34 years, respectively.  Assuming geometric depreciation, the
rates of depreciation corresponding to these useful lives are 4.1744% and
6.5481%, respectively.  Unfortunately, the data needed to calculate the
depreciation on consumer durables and on the plant and equipment of family
businesses were not available.  Thus, we had no choice but to ignore the fact
that there is saving in the form of investment in real assets in the case of
the consumer durables and business motives and to assume that dissaving for
these motives takes the form of the decumulation of financial assets and newly
incurred debt.
C. The Estimation Results
       Our estimates of household saving by motive are shown in Tables 1-6 and
Figure 1.  Table 1 shows data on gross saving in the form of the accumulation
of financial assets by motive, Table 2 data on gross saving in the form of
loan repayments by motive, Table 3 data on dissaving in the form of the
decumulation of financial assets by motive, Table 4 data on dissaving in the
form of newly incurred debt by motive, Table 5 data on dissaving in the form
of depreciation on owner-occupied housing, and Table 6 and Figure 1 data on
the total amount of gross saving, dissaving, and net saving by motive.7
Let us look first at our estimates of the total amount of gross saving,
9dissaving, and net saving for each motive (see Table 6 and Figure 1).  As can
be seen from Table 6, the composition of gross saving is remarkably similar in
the two countries: the housing motive ranks first in both countries with a
share of 25.21% in the U.S. and 28.95% in Japan, the retirement motive ranks a
close second in both countries with a share of 21.36% and 26.11%, respectively,
and the peace of mind motive ranks third in both countries with a share of
15.37% and 14.18%, respectively.  Turning to the composition of dissaving, the
housing motive ranks first by far in both countries with a share of 41.14% and
56.58%, respectively, and the consumer durables and education motives in the
U.S. and the peace of mind motive and “other” in Japan are the only other
motives with a share exceeding ten percent.  Turning finally to the
composition of net saving, which is what measures the contribution of saving
for each motive to overall household saving, it is by far the highest in the
case of the retirement motive in both countries, but the share of this motive
is more than twice as high in Japan as it is in the U.S. (62.23% vs. 30.84%).
The peace of mind and housing motives rank second and third in the U.S. with
shares of 20.74% and 14.60%, respectively, while the illness and peace of mind
motives rank second and third in Japan with shares of 22.26% and 18.92%,
respectively.  Note, however, that the illness and peace of mind motives are
both precautionary motives and that if they are combined, their combined share
is 27.93% in the U.S. and 41.18% in Japan.  Thus, the precautionary motive
broadly defined is the second most important motive for saving (after the
retirement motive) in both countries and is far more important in Japan than
it is in the U.S. (see Figure 1).  Note, finally, that net saving for the
housing motive has a negative share in Japan because, even though there is a
substantial amount of gross saving for the housing motive in Japan, it is more
than offset by an even larger amount of housing-related dissaving
10
(depreciation) and that the larger amount of depreciation on housing in Japan
is due, in turn, to the shorter useful life (lower durability) of housing in
Japan.
       Next, we would like to look at data on the importance of the bequest
motive, which is primarily consistent with the altruism and dynasty models.
The bequest motive is of only negligible importance in both countries, with
bequest-related saving amounting to only 3.03% and 0.72% of gross saving and
only 5.04% and 1.50% of net saving and with only 10.77% and 3.63% of
households saving for the bequest motive in the form of the accumulation of
financial assets in the U.S. and Japan, respectively.  It should be noted,
however, that the bequest motive can be defined more broadly to include the
education and marriage motives (because these motives entail intergenerational
transfers to one’s children) as well as the housing and business motives
(because housing and family businesses are often bequeathed to one’s children),
but even if the bequest motive is defined broadly to include these motives,
its share of net saving is only 24.96% in the U.S. and 1.64% in Japan.8  Thus,
it appears that the bequest motive is stronger in the U.S. than in Japan but
that it is not very strong even in the U.S.
Looking more briefly at the composition of gross saving and dissaving,
it can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that gross saving consists primarily of the
accumulation of financial assets in the case of most motives, with loan
repayments exceeding the accumulation of financial assets only in the case of
the housing and consumer durables motives and “other” in both countries.
Similarly, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, dissaving consists primarily of
the decumulation of financial assets, with newly incurred debt exceeding the
decumulation of financial assets only in the case of the housing motive and
“other” (in both countries) and the consumer durables and education motives
11
(in the case of the U.S.).  These findings are not surprising because it is
primarily in the case of housing, consumer durables, and (in the case of the
U.S.) education that credit markets are well-developed.  As noted earlier,
however, in the case of the housing motive, both dissaving in the form of the
decumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form of newly incurred
debt are fully offset by saving in the form of housing investment, as a result
of which the only form of dissaving is depreciation on owner-occupied housing
(see Table 5).
D. Summary
Our results suggest that the life cycle model is much more applicable
than the altruism and dynasty models in both the U.S. and Japan inasmuch as
life cycle motives such as the retirement motive and precautionary motives
such as the illness and peace of mind motives (which are also consistent with
the life cycle model) are of dominant importance and the bequest motive is of
negligible importance in both countries.  Moreover, our results also suggest
that the life cycle model is of much greater applicability in Japan than it is
in the U.S. and that the altruism and dynasty models are much more applicable
in the U.S. than they are in Japan inasmuch as the share of the retirement
motive (the most important life cycle motive) in net saving is twice as large
in Japan as it is in the U.S., the share of the precautionary motive is also
much higher in Japan, and the share of the bequest motive in gross saving and
net saving as well as the proportion of households saving for the bequest
motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets are much smaller in
Japan than they are in the U.S. (regardless of whether bequests are defined
narrowly or broadly).9  Note, moreover, that the altruism and dynasty models
might be even less applicable in both countries than suggested by our findings
12
because, as noted earlier, bequests could well be motivated by selfish
considerations, which are consistent with the life cycle model rather than
with the altruism and dynasty models.  (We present data on bequest motives in
section V.B.)
Note, however, that U.S.-Japan differences in the relative importance of
the various saving motives may be due not to differences in which model(s) of
household behavior apply in the two countries but to differences in the
economic and institutional environments (the size and source of external
shocks, the availability of a social safety net, the position of the economy
in the business cycle, etc.) faced by households in the two countries or to
differences in the age and/or income distribution of the population in the two
countries.  With respect to the former, it could be, for example, that saving
for the retirement motive is far more important in Japan than it is in the U.S.
not because the life cycle model is more applicable in Japan but because
public and private pensions are less available or because there is greater
uncertainty about future benefit levels in Japan.  With respect to the latter,
saving motives differ greatly by age (see the breakdown by age in Horioka and
Watanabe (1997, 1998)), and thus U.S.-Japan differences in the relative
importance of the various saving motives could be due in part to differences
in the age distribution of the population in the two countries.  For example,
the importance of the retirement motive increases sharply with age in both
countries, and thus the fact that Japan’s population is much older than that
of the U.S. can help explain why the retirement motive was found to be so much
more important in Japan than it is in the U.S.10  Thus, our conclusions must be
regarded as tentative.11
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V. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequests, Bequest Motives, and Bequest Division
In this section, we present data from the U.S.-Japan Survey on bequests,
bequest motives, and bequest division, where bequests are defined throughout
to include inter vivos transfers.
A. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Importance of Bequests
Table 7 shows data on the prevalence of bequests in the two countries,
and as can be seen from this table, the proportion of respondents who have
received bequests in the past is 28.67% in the U.S. but only 22.35% in Japan,
the proportion of respondents who expect to receive bequests in the future is
28.40% in the U.S. but only 22.10% in Japan, and the proportion of respondents
who have received bequests in the past and/or who expect to receive them in
the future is 48.88% in the U.S. but only 40.18% in Japan.  Moreover, as can
be seen from Table 8, 45.92% of U.S. respondents want to make efforts to leave
behind a bequest to their children, whereas this proportion is only 25.72% in
Japan (these figures represent the proportion of respondents holding either
view 1 or view 2). Finally, as we saw in section IV, 10.77% of U.S.
respondents are saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets in
order to leave a bequest, whereas this proportion is only 3.63% in Japan.  It
thus appears that individuals who have received or expect to receive bequests
and individuals who plan to leave bequests are in the minority in both
countries but that bequests are considerably more prevalent in the U.S. than
they are in Japan.  These results suggest that the bequest motive is
relatively weak in both countries but especially weak in Japan.
However, Table 7 also shows data on the amount of bequests, and as can
be seen from this table, the average bequest (at current market value) of
respondents who have received bequests in the past is $74,756 (2.131 times
14
average annual household disposable income) in the U.S. and 54,110,000 yen
(9.630 times average annual household disposable income) in Japan.  Moreover,
the average bequest of all respondents is $21,431 (0.611 times average annual
household disposable income) in the U.S. and 12,090,000 yen (2.152 times
average annual household disposable income) in Japan.  Thus, the average
bequest-income ratio is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.  The
proportion of respondents who have received bequests in the past is somewhat
higher in the U.S. and thus the U.S.-Japan gap in the bequest-income ratio is
smaller in the case of all respondents than it is in the case of respondents
who have received bequests in the past, but it is still quite high (the
bequest-income ratio in Japan is 4.520 times higher than the U.S. ratio in the
case of respondents who have received bequests in the past and 3.524 times
higher than the U.S. ratio in the case of all respondents).
Thus, whether bequests are more prevalent in the U.S. or in Japan
depends on which criterion is used, but all measures pertaining to the
proportion of households receiving or leaving bequests suggest that bequests
are considerably more prevalent in the U.S.  It thus appears that a smaller
proportion of households receive or leave bequests in Japan but that those who
do receive or leave bequests receive or leave much larger bequests than in the
U.S.
B. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequest Motives
Note, however, that whether the life cycle model, the altruism model, or
the dynasty model applies in the real world depends more on the motives for
which people leave bequests than on the prevalence or amount of bequests.
Fortunately, the U.S.-Japan Survey also collects data on the bequest motives
of respondents, and it is to these data that we now turn.
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In one question, respondents are asked which of four views they hold
with respect to leaving a bequest to their children.  View 1 ("I want to make
efforts to leave behind a bequest regardless of whether my child or children
look after me after I retire") is an altruistic or dynastic bequest motive,
view 2 ("I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as long as my child
or children look after me after I retire") is a selfish bequest motive (either
a strategic bequest motive à la Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) or an
implicit intra-family annuity contract à la Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)), view
3 ("I will not make any particular efforts to leave behind a bequest but will
leave to my child or children whatever assets happen to be left over")
indicates that only unintended or accidental bequests will be left, and view 4
("I will not leave any bequest at all to my child or children") indicates the
total absence of a bequest motive.  View 1 is consistent with the altruism and
dynasty models whereas views 2, 3 and 4 are consistent with the life cycle
model, and thus information on the relative prevalence of these views will
shed light on whether the life cycle model, the altruism model, or the dynasty
model is applicable in the real world.
The results are shown in Table 8, and as this table shows, 42.60% of U.S.
respondents hold view 1, whereas this proportion is only 19.29% in Japan.
Since view 1 is consistent with the altruism and dynasty models, this result
suggests that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with
the altruism and dynasty models is more than twice as high in the U.S. as it
is in Japan.  By contrast, the proportion of respondents holding views 2, 3,
and 4 is much lower in the U.S. than in Japan (3.32% vs. 6.43% in the case of
view 2, 51.14% vs. 70.10% in the case of view 3, 2.94% vs. 4.18% in the case
of view 4, and 57.40% vs. 80.71% in the case of these three views combined).
Since views 2, 3, and 4 are all consistent with the life cycle model, the fact
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that a majority of respondents in both countries adhere to views 2, 3, or 4
suggests that the life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior
in both countries, and the fact that the proportion of respondents adhering to
views 2, 3, or 4 is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. suggests that
the life cycle model is much more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S.
C. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Attitudes toward Bequest Division
The U.S.-Japan Survey also asks about the respondents' attitudes toward
bequest division, with respondents being asked to choose from among six views.
View 1 ("It will be divided equally among my children") is not, in general,
consistent with any theoretical model but is consistent with the altruism
model if parents love their children equally and believe that their children’s
own resources and needs are roughly equal, and view 2 ("Most or all of it will
be willed to the child or children with the least income") is consistent with
the altruism model, whereas view 3 ("Most or all of it will be willed to the
child or children who look after me") is consistent with the life cycle model,
and view 4 ("Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children who
carry on my business") and view 5 ("Most or all of it will be willed to my
oldest son/daughter regardless of whether he/she looks after me") are
consistent with the dynasty model.12  (It is not possible to say a priori with
which model view 6 (“other”) is consistent.)  Thus, information on the
relative prevalence of these views will shed further light on whether the life
cycle model, the altruism model, or the dynasty model is applicable in the
real world.
The results are shown in Table 9, and as this table shows, in the U.S.,
the proportion of respondents holding view 1 is 96.28% and the proportion
holding either view 1 or view 2 is 96.83%, whereas these proportions are only
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48.74% and 51.10%, respectively, in the case of Japan.13  Since views 1 and 2
are (or may be) consistent with the altruism model, these results suggest that
the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with the altruism
model is nearly twice as high in the U.S. as it is in Japan.  By contrast, the
proportion of households holding views 3, 4, and 5 is much higher in Japan
than in the U.S. (32.38% vs. 2.48% in the case of view 3, 6.91% vs. 0.00% in
the case of view 4, and 7.59% vs. 0.41% in the case of view 5).  Since view 3
is consistent with the life cycle model, these results suggest that the
proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with the life cycle
model is far higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. (32.38% vs. 2.48%), and
since views 4 and 5 are consistent with the dynasty model, these results
suggest that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with
the dynasty model is far higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. (14.50% vs.
0.41%).  However, the proportion of respondents holding a view that is
consistent with the dynasty model is only 14.50% even in Japan, suggesting
that the dynasty model is not the dominant model of household behavior in
either country.
D. Further Evidence on the Applicability of the Dynasty Model
Additional evidence on the applicability of the dynasty model is given
in Tables 10 and 11.  First, Table 10 shows data on the types of assets
respondents plan to leave as a bequest, and as this table shows, 32.67% of
Americans planning to leave bequests plan to leave assets they inherited and
96.60% plan to leave assets they acquired themselves, whereas in Japan the
corresponding proportions are 39.71% and 83.35%.  Thus, the tendency to leave
acquired assets is much stronger than the tendency to leave inherited assets
in both countries, and the tendency to leave acquired assets is considerably
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stronger in the U.S. than it is in Japan whereas the tendency to leave
inherited assets is considerably stronger in Japan than it is in the U.S.
Individuals regard inherited assets as belonging to their family (dynasty)
rather than to themselves personally, according to the dynasty model, and thus
these findings suggest that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than
it is in the U.S. but that it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.
Note that these conclusions are fully consistent with our conclusions based on
data on attitudes toward bequest division.
Turning to the second type of evidence, Table 11 shows the distribution
of respondents by bequest motive, broken down by whether the respondent has
received bequests in the past and/or expects to receive them in the future.
As this table shows, in both countries, those who have received bequests in
the past and/or who expect to receive bequests in the future are considerably
more likely to have an altruistic or dynastic bequest motive (view 1) or a
selfish bequest motive (view 2) and considerably less likely to plan to leave
only unintended bequests (view 3) or to plan to leave no bequest at all (view
4).  This suggests that both Americans and Japanese are motivated to some
extent by dynastic considerations (i.e., that they tend to feel obligated to
leave a bequest to their children if they themselves received a bequest from
their parents).  However, this tendency is not necessarily any stronger in the
case of Japan, contrary to what the data in Table 10 suggest.
E. A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Behavior of Bequest Recipients
Thus far, we have focused almost exclusively on the attitudes and
behavior of bequest givers (the parents), but in this section we focus on the
behavior of bequest recipients (the children).  If the children are altruistic,
we would expect them to look after their aged parents whether or not they
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expect to receive a bequest from them and whether or not the receipt of a
bequest is conditional on their looking after their parents.  By contrast, if
the children are selfish, we would expect them to look after their aged
parents only if they expect to receive a bequest from them or, more precisely,
only if the receipt of the bequest is conditional on their looking after their
parents.  Thus, we can shed light on whether the children are altruistic or
selfish by seeing whether there is any correlation between the parent’s
bequest intentions and the children’s behavior (in particular, whether or not
they look after their aged parents).  The U.S.-Japan Survey did not collect
direct information on how must care children provide to their aged parents so
we have used coresidence as a proxy therefor.  Since it is presumably easier
for children to care for their parents and to provide financial and in-kind
assistance to their parents if they live together, we believe that coresidence
is likely to be a good proxy for care provided by children to their aged
parents.
First, Table 12 shows data on the coresidence rates of respondents?aged
49 years and younger and their parents, broken down by whether or not the
respondent expects to receive a bequest from their parents, and as this table
shows, in both countries, respondents who expect to receive a bequest from
their parents are more likely to live with them.  This suggests that children
are motivated by selfish considerations in both countries.  However, the
impact of bequest expectations on coresidence is much greater in Japan than it
is in the U.S.: the coresidence rate of those with (without) bequest
expectations is 24.61% (18.79%) in Japan and 7.02 (6.75%) in the U.S.  This
suggests that children are much more selfish in Japan than they are in the
U.S.14
Next, Table 13 shows data on coresidence rates of aged respondents
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(respondents aged 60 and older) and their children, broken down by bequest
motive, and as this table shows, the coresidence rate varies relatively little
by bequest motive in the U.S. and is, in fact, lowest in the case of
respondents with a selfish bequest motive (6.67%) and second lowest in the
case of respondents with an altruistic bequest motive (7.53%) even though we
would expect it to the highest for these respondents if their children are
selfish (the coresidence rate is highest for respondents planning to leave
only unintended bequests (12.02%) and second highest for respondents planning
to leave no bequest at all (7.69%)).  By contrast, the coresidence rate varies
substantially by bequest motive in Japan and the observed pattern is fully
consistent with the hypothesis that children are selfish in Japan: the
coresidence rates of respondents with selfish or altruistic bequest motives is
by far the highest (63.89% and 63.46%, respectively) and is about 1.3 times as
high as that of respondents planning to leave only unintended bequests
(49.45%) and more than two-and-a-half times as high as that of respondents
with no bequest motive (25.00%).  These results suggest that American children
are altruistic whereas Japanese children are selfish.15
We also did a probit analysis of coresidence between aged parents and
their children including as explanatory variables income, the square of income,
the age, marital status, sex, and health of the household head, housing tenure,
city size, bequest motives, and (in the case of the U.S.) the race of the
household head and found that the bequest motive dummies are totally
insignificant in the case of the U.S. but that the dummies for the altruistic
and selfish bequest motives are positive and marginally significant in the
case of Japan.  This demonstrates that the conclusion we drew from Table 13
does not change even when we control for other factors.
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F. Summary
To sum up, bequests appear to be motivated primarily by selfish
considerations in both countries, suggesting that the life cycle model is the
dominant model of household behavior in both countries, but they appear to be
motivated to a far greater extent by intergenerational altruism in the U.S.
than they are in Japan, suggesting that the altruism model is far more
applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan.  By contrast, bequests appear to
be motivated to a far greater extent by selfish and dynastic motives
(especially the former) in Japan than they are in the U.S., suggesting that
the life cycle and dynasty models (especially the former) are far more
applicable in Japan than they are in the U.S.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a variety of data on saving and bequest
motives in the U.S. and Japan from the “Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan
and the U.S.,” a binational household survey conducted in 1996 by the
Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications of the Government of Japan, in order to shed light on which
model of household behavior applies in the two countries.  The evidence is
remarkably consistent, with the vast majority of it suggesting (1) that the
selfish life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in both
countries but that it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S.,
(2) that the altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it is in
Japan but that it is not the dominant model of household behavior in either
country, and (3) that the dynasty model is more applicable in Japan than it is
in the U.S. but that it is of only limited applicability even in Japan.
Looking first at the evidence in support of our conclusion that the life
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cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in both countries, we
found (1) that saving for life-cycle motives (especially saving for the
retirement and precautionary motives) comprises the bulk of household saving
in both countries, (2) that saving for the bequest motive is of negligible
importance in both countries, (3) that individuals who received or expect to
receive bequests, individuals who plan to make efforts to leave behind a
bequest, and individuals who are saving for the purpose of leaving behind a
bequest are in the minority in both countries, (4) that a majority of
individuals in both countries either do not plan to leave a bequest, plan to
leave only unintended or accidental bequests, or plan to leave a bequest only
if their children look after them in their old age, and (5) that, in both
countries, those who expect to receive a bequest are more likely to live with
their parents than those who do not expect to receive a bequest.
Turning to the evidence that the selfish life cycle model is more
applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S., we found (1) that the share of
saving for motives that are consistent with the life cycle model (especially
the retirement and precautionary motives) is much higher in Japan than it is
in the U.S., (2) that the proportion of households saving in order to leave
behind a bequest as well as the share of bequest-related saving are much
higher in the U.S. than they are in Japan, (3) that the proportion of
households receiving or expecting to receive bequests is somewhat higher in
the U.S. than it is in Japan, (4) that the proportion of households planning
to make efforts to leave behind a bequest is much higher in the U.S. than it
is in Japan, (5) that bequests are motivated to a far greater extent by
selfish considerations in Japan than they are in the U.S. and that they are
motivated to a far greater extent by intergenerational altruism in the U.S.
than they are in Japan, judging not only from the data on bequest motives but
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also from the data on attitudes toward bequest division, and (6) that the
correlation between whether or not one expects to receive a bequest from one’s
parents and whether or not one lives with one’s parents and that between
whether or not one has a bequest motive and whether or not one lives with
one’s children is much stronger in Japan than it is in the U.S.
Turning finally to the evidence that the dynasty model is more
applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. but that it is of only limited
applicability even in Japan, we found (1) that the proportion of respondents
who plan to leave most or all of their bequest to the child who carries on the
family business or to the eldest child (regardless of whether that child takes
care of them) is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S. but not very high
even in Japan, (2) that the proportion of respondents who plan to leave behind
assets that they themselves inherited is higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.
but not very high even in Japan, and (3) that the correlation between whether
or not a respondent received or expects to receive a bequest and whether or
not a respondent plans to make efforts to leave behind a bequest is positive
in both countries but not overwhelming.
Reassuringly, our findings are broadly consistent with those of previous
studies for both countries.  With respect to Japan, our finding that the life
cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior is fully consistent
with the findings of Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), Hayashi (1995),
and other previous studies.  With respect to the U.S., our finding that the
life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior is consistent
with the findings of Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), Cox (1987), Hurd
(1987), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1989), and other previous studies,
but our finding that a substantial minority of Americans is altruistic is
somewhat at variance with some previous studies.
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Turning next to directions for further research, our finding that the
various models of household behavior coexist in both countries suggests that
theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented analyses must take account of this
coexistence.  Second, our finding that the altruism and dynasty models are not
the dominant models of household behavior in either country suggests that
further theoretical work using these models is of limited value.  Third, our
finding that precautionary saving is of significant importance in both
countries suggests that further work in this area holds great promise.  Fourth,
we found that the proportion of households whose behavior is consistent with
each model varies greatly depending on which criterion is used, and thus it
would be desirable to reconcile the various findings.  Fifth, our finding that
the magnitude of bequests is much larger in Japan than it is in the U.S. is
surprising because income growth has been much more rapid in Japan, meaning
that the gap between the lifetime incomes of younger generations and those of
older generations is much greater in Japan than it is in the U.S., which in
turn means that one would expect Japanese parents to leave far smaller
bequests to their children than American parents.  A further investigation of
the reasons for our counterintuitive result is warranted.16  Sixth, it would be
interesting if similar data could be obtained for other countries as well.17
Turning finally to policy implications, as discussed by Barro (1974),
Becker (1974, 1981), and Weil (1989), the various models have very different
policy implications.  For example, competitive equilibria will always be
efficient, the existence of asset bubbles is ruled out, and the Ricardian debt
neutrality proposition holds in the case of the altruism model, while the
opposite holds in the case of the life cycle and dynasty models.  Thus, our
findings should be of interest not only to economists but also to policymakers.
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Footnotes
1Note that the dynasty model is a special case of Weil's (1989) model, which
assumes that new and infinitely linked dynasties, which are not linked to pre-
existing families through operative intergenerational transfers, continuously
enter the economy over time, because children who are not first-born or who do
not carry on the family line or the family business represent the new
dynasties that Weil's model requires.
2A comparison of the samples for each country with those of similar household
surveys in the same country showed that the samples are more or less
representative.
3A copy of the full questionnaire is available upon request from the
corresponding author.
4It could be argued that capital gains and losses on fixed assets such as land,
housing, etc., should be included in the saving for the purchase of such
assets, but I have chosen not to do so because I was interested in knowing how
much saving for each motive contributes to the national income accounts
concept of saving, which does not include capital gains or losses.
5Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the proportion of respondents
saving for each motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets,
the proportion of respondents saving for each motive in the form of loan
repayments, the proportion of respondents dissaving for each motive in the
form of the decumulation of financial assets, or the proportion of respondents
dissaving for each motive in the form of newly incurred debt from the data in
the U.S.-Japan Survey because it is not possible to differentiate between
those who are not saving or dissaving for a given motive and those who did not
respond to the question.  Thus, we estimated the proportion of respondents
saving for each motive in the form of the accumulation of financial assets on
the assumption that all respondents who hold financial assets for the motive
in question but did not indicate whether or not they accumulated further
financial assets for that motive during the past year did, in fact, do so.
Similarly, we estimated the proportion of respondents saving for each motive
in the form of loan repayments on the assumption that all respondents who have
outstanding loans for the motive in question but did not indicate whether or
not they made any payments on such loans during the past year did, in fact, do
so.  We made the aforementioned assumptions because households holding
financial assets for a given motive are likely to be accumulating financial
assets for that motive on a regular basis, even if they did not indicate
whether or not they are doing so, and similarly, households with outstanding
loans for a given motive are likely to be repaying those loans on a regular
basis, even if they did not indicate whether or not they are doing so.  By
contrast, we estimated the proportion of respondents dissaving for each motive
in the form of the decumulation of financial assets on the assumption that all
respondents who hold financial assets for a given motive but did not indicate
whether or not they decumulated any of these assets during the past year did
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not, in fact, do so.  Similarly, we estimated the proportion of respondents
dissaving for each motive in the form of newly incurred debt on the assumption
that all respondents who have outstanding loans for a given motive but did not
indicate whether or not they incurred any new debts for the motive in question
during the past year did not, in fact, do so.   It appeared reasonable to make
these assumptions because decumulating financial assets and/or incurring new
debt in order to realize a given motive are likely to be one-time events
involving large sums of money, and thus we would expect non-response to be
less of a problem than in the case of saving in the form of the accumulation
of financial assets or in the form of loan repayments.
6With respect to the treatment of outliers, it is customary to decumulate a
considerable amount of financial assets or to incur a considerable amount of
new debt when realizing certain motives such as the housing motive; hence, a
large amount of dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets
or in the form of newly incurred debt is not necessarily suspect.  By contrast,
saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets or in the form of
loan repayments is typically done gradually over a number of years out of
current income.  Thus, we excluded what appeared to be outliers only in the
case of saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets or in the
form of loan repayments.
  
7As the results show, the net saving rate implied by our results is broadly
consistent with the National Accounts figure in the case of Japan but is much
higher than the National Accounts figure in the case of the United States.
The reason for this is not clear and warrants further investigation, but in
this paper, we are interested in the composition of saving by motive rather
than in the level thereof.  We are indebted to B. Douglas Bernheim and Daekeun
Park for this point.
8Note, however, that the share of the bequest motive broadly defined in gross
saving is 35.59% in the U.S. and 39.69% in Japan, meaning that it is
substantial in both countries and slightly higher in Japan than it is in the
U.S.  We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm for this point.
  
9Refer to Horioka and Okui (1999) for an analysis of the importance and
determinants of retirement saving in the U.S. and Japan using the same data
source.  They find that, in both countries, retirement saving is influenced by
some (though not all) of the factors identified by the extended life cycle
model, especially expected living expenses during retirement.
  
10We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm and Daekeun Park for these points.
11The shares of the population aged 0-19, 20-39, 40-59, and 60 and over were
32.0% (22.4%), 31.9% (27.8%), 20.3% (28.9%), and 15.7% (21.0%), respectively,
in the United States (Japan) as of July 1, 1996.
12In Japan, it has traditionally been the eldest son who carries on the family
line or the family business, and in prewar Japan, the law stipulated that the
entire bequest goes to the eldest son.
  
13The U.S. results are broadly consistent with the findings of Dunn and
Phillips (1997), who find that 90% of Americans bequeath at least some assets
to all of their children.
14Note, however, that the altruism model requires only that the parents be
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altruistic.  Thus, the fact that the children are selfish does not necessarily
contradict the altruism model.
15Horioka et al. (1996) also find that, in Japan, aged respondents with an
altruistic or selfish bequest motive are roughly twice as likely to receive
financial assistance from their children as those with no bequest motive,
which again suggests that children are selfish in Japan.
  
16We are indebted to Christopher D. Carroll and Daekeun Park for this point.
One possible explanation of our result is habit formation (see, for example,
Carroll (2000)).
17The Urban Households Saving Market Study, conducted by the Bank of Korea in
1995, asked Korean households about their bequest motives and found that the
proportion of respondents with an altruistic bequest motive is somewhat higher
in Korea than it is in Japan but not nearly as high as it is in the U.S.
(25.7% in Korea vs. 42.6% in the U.S. and 19.3% in Japan), that the proportion
of respondents with a selfish bequest motive is far, far higher in Korea than
it is in either the U.S. or Japan (22.8% in Korea vs. 3.3% in the U.S. and
6.4% in Japan), and that the proportion of respondents with no bequest motive
(or planning to leave only unintended bequests) is lower in Korea than it is
in either the U.S. or Japan (51.5% in Korea vs. 54.1% in the U.S. and 74.3% in
Japan).  Since the second and third responses are consistent with the life
cycle model, these findings imply that the proportion of respondents adhering
to the life cycle model in Korea is much higher than it is in the U.S. but
somewhat lower than it is in Japan (74.3% in Korea vs. 57.4% in the U.S. and
80.6% in Japan).  Thus, it appears that Korea is between the U.S. and Japan
but closer to Japan with respect to the degree of applicability of the
altruism and life cycle models.  We are indebted to Joon-Ho Hahm for providing
us with the Korean data.
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The share of (4) in






1 Retirement 48.57 (1) 5797 (1) 16.52 2815 (1) 8.02 30.85
2 Living expenses 33.58 (5) 2411 (8) 6.87 810 (3) 2.31 8.87
3 Illness 42.57 (2) 1611 (12) 4.59 686 (5) 1.95 7.52
4 Education 21.10 (8) 2137 (9) 6.09 451 (8) 1.28 4.94
5 Marriage 6.78 (11) 3450 (4) 9.83 234 (11) 0.67 2.56
6 Housing 19.08 (9) 3289 (5) 9.37 627 (6) 1.79 6.88
7 Consumer durables 24.60 (7) 1667 (11) 4.75 410 (9) 1.17 4.49
8 Leisure 34.81 (4) 1703 (10) 4.85 593 (7) 1.69 6.50
9 Tax 30.87 (6) 2443 (7) 6.96 754 (4) 2.15 8.27
10 Business 3.95 (12) 5220 (2) 14.88 206 (12) 0.59 2.26
11 Peace of mind 37.70 (3) 2930 (6) 8.35 1105 (2) 3.15 12.10
12 Bequest 10.77 (10) 3708 (3) 10.57 399 (10) 1.14 4.38
13 Other 1.54 2260 6.44 35 0.10 0.38
Total 315.92 9125 26.01 100.00
Japan
1 Retirement 45.21 (1) 84.87 (1) 15.10 38.37 (1) 6.83 36.86
2 Living expenses
3 Illness 37.21 (3) 41.19 (4) 7.33 15.33 (3) 2.73 14.73
4 Education 23.95 (4) 35.74 (6) 6.36 8.56 (5) 1.52 8.22
5 Marriage 11.36 (5) 39.46 (5) 7.02 4.48 (6) 0.80 4.31
6 Housing 10.76 (6) 80.26 (2) 14.28 8.63 (4) 1.54 8.30
7 Consumer durables 6.14 (8) 28.76 (8) 5.12 1.77 (8) 0.31 1.70
8 Leisure 9.84 (7) 27.17 (9) 4.84 2.67 (7) 0.48 2.57
9 Tax 5.69 (9) 23.67 (10) 4.21 1.35 (9) 0.24 1.29
10 Business 0.96 (11) 12.00 (11) 2.14 0.12 (11) 0.02 0.11
11 Peace of mind 39.62 (2) 50.61 (3) 9.01 20.05 (2) 3.57 19.26
12 Bequest 3.63 (10) 29.38 (7) 5.23 1.07 (10) 0.19 1.02
13 Other 3.19 53.00 9.43 1.69 0.30 1.62
Total 197.56 104.08 18.52 100.00
Data source: The Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy, Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, Government of Japan, "A Comparative Survey of Savings
in Japan and the United States" (1996).
Notes: Refer to the main text for an explanation of the calculation method.  The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").
Table 1: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Gross Saving in the Form of the Accumulation of Financial Assets for Each Motive
The proportion of
households saving for





The average amount of gross
saving for each motive in the form
of the accumulation of financial
assets of households saving for
each motive in that form (in units
of dollars or 10,000 yen)
(4)
The average amount of gross
saving for each motive in the
form of the accumulation of
financial assets of all
households (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)
(3) (5) (6)
Motive










The share of (4) in




1 Living expenses 5.16 (5) 2181 (4) 6.22 113 (4) 0.32 3.01
2 Illness 8.09 (3) 1569 (5) 4.47 127 (3) 0.36 3.39
3 Education 2.37 (6) 3128 (2) 8.92 74 (6) 0.21 1.98
4 Marriage 0.52 (7) 800 (7) 2.28 4 (7) 0.01 0.11
5 Housing 39.54 (1) 6821 (1) 19.44 2697 (1) 7.69 72.08
6 Consumer durables 21.64 (2) 3044 (3) 8.67 659 (2) 1.88 17.60
7 Leisure 5.47 (4) 1394 (6) 3.97 76 (5) 0.22 2.04
8 Other 11.11 2786 7.94 310 0.88 8.27
Total 77.75 3741 10.66 100.00
1 Living expenses 2.12 (4) 37.33 (6) 6.64 0.79 (4) 0.14 1.96
2 Illness 0.30 (7) 50.00 (3) 8.90 0.15 (6) 0.03 0.37
3 Education 2.50 (3) 41.12 (4.5) 7.32 1.03 (3) 0.18 2.55
4 Marriage 0.81 (5) 67.00 (2) 11.92 0.54 (5) 0.10 1.35
5 Housing 24.08 (1) 140.84 (1) 25.06 33.91 (1) 6.04 84.00
6 Consumer durables 6.90 (2) 41.12 (4.5) 7.32 2.84 (2) 0.51 7.03
7 Leisure 0.61 (6) 23.60 (7) 4.20 0.14 (7) 0.03 0.35
8 Other 5.17 67.29 11.98 3.48 0.62 8.61
Total 36.75 40.37 7.18 100.00
Table 2: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Gross Saving in the Form of Loan Repayments for Each Motive
Data source: The same as Table 1.
The proportion of
households saving
for each motive in
the form of loan
repayments (%)
(1) (2)
The average amount of gross saving
for each motive in the form of loan
repayments of households saving for
each motive in that form (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)
(4)
The average amount of gross
saving for each motive in the
form of loan repayments of
all households (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)
Notes: Refer to the main text for an explanation of the calculation method.  The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").
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United States




















The share of (4) in
dissaving in the form of
the decumulation of




1 Retirement 6.33 (4) 5368 (3) 15.30 340 (1) 0.97 23.14 23.80
2A Living expenses
 (age 59 or younger) 4.24 (5) 2004 (9) 5.71 85 (8) 2.42 5.78 5.95
2B Living expenses
 (age 60 or older) 1.41 (9) 2565 (7) 7.31 36 (10) 1.03 2.47 2.54
3 Illness 7.27 (3) 1894 (10) 5.40 138 (4) 3.92 9.38 9.65
4 Education 1.36 (10) 6734 (1) 19.19 91 (7) 2.60 6.22 6.40
5 Marriage 0.18 (11.5) 6000 (2) 17.10 11 (11) 0.31 0.73 0.75
6 Housing 1.83 (8) 2236 (8) 6.37 41 (9) 1.17 2.79
7 Consumer durables 3.35 (7) 3897 (5) 11.11 131 (5) 3.72 8.90 9.15
8 Leisure 7.42 (2) 1717 (11) 4.89 127 (6) 3.63 8.69 8.93
9 Tax 8.33 (1) 2974 (6) 8.48 248 (2) 7.06 16.89 17.37
10 Business 0.18 (11.5) 600 (13) 1.71 1 (12.5) 0.03 0.08 0.08
11 Peace of mind 4.11 (6) 5136 (4) 14.64 211 (3) 6.02 14.40 14.81
12 Bequest 0.09 (13) 1000 (12) 2.85 1 (12.5) 0.03 0.06 0.06
13 Other 0.17 4200 11.97 7 0.02 0.49 0.50




 (age 59 or younger) 10.02 (1) 96.86 (8) 17.24 9.71 (2) 1.73 18.60 34.32
2B Living expenses
 (age 60 or older) 3.13 (4) 106.90 (7) 19.02 3.34 (4) 0.59 6.40 11.81
3 Illness 2.73 (5) 108.35 (6) 19.28 2.95 (5) 0.53 5.66 10.44
4 Education 3.47 (3) 116.73 (5) 20.77 4.05 (3) 0.72 7.76 14.30
5 Marriage 0.42 (10) 167.50 (3) 29.81 0.71 (9) 0.13 1.36 2.51
6 Housing 2.13 (6) 1121.50 (1) 199.58 23.89 (1) 4.25 45.78
7 Consumer durables 1.51 (8) 134.29 (4) 23.90 2.03 (6) 0.36 3.88 7.16
8 Leisure 3.74 (2) 37.49 (11) 6.67 1.40 (7) 0.25 2.69 4.96
9 Tax 1.72 (7) 70.25 (9) 12.50 1.21 (8) 0.21 2.31 4.27
10 Business 0.11 (11) 300.00 (2) 53.39 0.32 (10) 0.06 0.62 1.14
11 Peace of mind 0.00 (12) 0.00 (12) 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 Bequest 0.55 (9) 40.40 (10) 7.19 0.22 (11) 0.04 0.43 0.78
13 Other 1.06 221.00 39.33 2.35 0.42 4.50 8.31
Total 30.58 52.17 9.28 100.00 100.00
Table 3: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of the Decumulation of Financial Assets for Each Motive
Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method.  The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").




for each motive in
the form of the
decumulation of
financial assets (%)
The average amount of
dissaving in the form of the
decumulation of financial
assets of households
dissaving for each motive in
that form (in units of dollars
or 10,000 yen)
(4)
The average amount of
dissaving in the form of
the decumulation of
financial assets of all
households (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)



















The share of (4) in
dissaving in the form of
newly incurred debt for
all motives (excluding
the housing motive) (%)
1 Living expenses 1.60 (5) 5631 (4) 16.05 90 (5) 0.26 2.58 5.38
2 Illness 2.67 (3) 3989 (5) 11.37 106 (4) 0.30 3.05 6.35
3 Education 0.59 (6) 75071 (1) 213.95 445 (3) 1.27 12.74 26.55
4 Marriage 0.00 (7) 0 (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 Housing 3.60 (2) 50442 (2) 143.76 1816 (1) 5.18 52.00
6 Consumer durables 8.00 (1) 7575 (3) 21.59 606 (2) 1.73 17.35 36.14
7 Leisure 1.82 (4) 2167 (6) 6.17 40 (6) 0.11 1.13 2.36
8 Other 3.09 12601 35.91 390 1.11 11.15 23.23
Total 16.52 2851 8.13 81.63 88.28
1 Living expenses 1.01 (3) 48.00 (5) 8.54 0.48 (4) 0.09 0.49 0.48
2 Illness 0.00 (7) 0.00 (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 Education 0.50 (4) 120.40 (3) 21.43 0.60 (3) 0.11 0.61 0.60
4 Marriage 0.10 (6) 200.00 (2) 35.59 0.20 (5) 0.04 0.20 0.20
5 Housing 2.17 (1) 4117.50 (1) 732.74 89.46 (1) 15.92 90.13
6 Consumer durables 2.10 (2) 81.52 (4) 14.51 1.71 (2) 0.30 1.73 1.71
7 Leisure 0.20 (5) 20.00 (6) 3.56 0.04 (6) 0.01 0.04 0.04
8 Other 1.49 539.73 96.05 8.04 1.43 8.11 8.04
Total 5.97 99.25 17.66 100.00 9.79
Table 4: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of Newly Incurred Debt for Each Motive









The average amount of dissaving
for each motive in the form of
newly incurred debt of
households dissaving for each
motive in that form (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)
(4)
The average amount of
dissaving for each motive
in the form of newly
incurred debt of all
households (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)
Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method.  The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each motive (excluding "other").
Japan
United States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Motive
The proportion of households
dissaving in the form of
depreciation on owner-
occupied housing (%)
The average amount of dissaving in the
form of depreciation on owner-occupied
housing of households dissaving in that
form (in units of dollars or 10,000 yen)




The average amount of dissaving in the
form of depreciation on owner-occupied
housing of all households (in units of
dollars or 10,000 yen)




Housing 67.90 3195 9.11 2169 6.18
Total 67.90 2169 6.18
Housing 62.74 81.78 14.55 51.31 9.13
Total 62.74 51.31 9.13
Data source: The same as Table 1.
United States
Japan
Table 5: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Dissaving in the Form of Depreciation on Owner-Occupied Housing
Notes: Refer to the main text for a description of the calculation method.







































1 Retirement 2815 (2) 8.02 21.36 376 (5) 1.07 7.13 2440 (1) 6.95 30.84
2 Illness 813 (5) 2.32 6.16 244 (7) 0.70 4.63 569 (4) 1.62 7.19
3 Education 525 (8) 1.50 3.98 536 (3) 1.53 10.17 -11 (11) -0.03 -0.14
4 Marriage 238 (10) 0.68 1.81 11 (9) 0.03 0.20 227 (9) 0.65 2.87
5 Housing 3324 (1) 9.47 25.21 2169 (1) 6.18 41.14 1155 (3) 3.29 14.60
6 Consumer durables 1069 (4) 3.05 8.11 737 (2) 2.10 13.97 332 (8) 0.95 4.20
7 Leisure 669 (7) 1.91 5.07 167 (8) 0.48 3.17 502 (6) 1.43 6.35
8 Tax 754 (6) 2.15 5.72 248 (6) 0.71 4.70 506 (5) 1.44 6.40
9 Business 206 (11) 0.59 1.56 1 (10.5) 0.00 0.02 205 (10) 0.58 2.59
10 Peace of mind 2027 (3) 5.78 15.37 386 (4) 1.10 7.33 1640 (2) 4.68 20.74
11 Bequest 399 (9) 1.14 3.03 1 (10.5) 0.00 0.02 398 (7) 1.14 5.04
12 Other 344 0.98 2.61 397 1.13 7.52 -52 -0.15 -0.66
Total 13184 37.57 100.00 5273 15.03 100.00 7911 22.55 100.00
1 Retirement 38.37 (2) 6.83 26.11 3.34 (5) 0.59 3.68 35.03 (1) 6.23 62.23
2 Illness 15.48 (4) 2.75 10.53 2.95 (6) 0.53 3.26 12.53 (2) 2.23 22.26
3 Education 9.59 (5) 1.71 6.52 4.65 (3) 0.83 5.13 4.94 (4) 0.88 8.77
4 Marriage 5.03 (6) 0.89 3.42 0.91 (9) 0.16 1.01 4.11 (5) 0.73 7.31
5 Housing 42.55 (1) 7.57 28.95 51.31 (1) 9.13 56.58 -8.76 (11) -1.56 -15.57
6 Consumer durables 4.61 (7) 0.82 3.13 3.74 (4) 0.67 4.12 0.87 (7) 0.15 1.54
7 Leisure 2.82 (8) 0.50 1.92 1.44 (7) 0.26 1.59 1.37 (6) 0.24 2.44
8 Tax 1.35 (9) 0.24 0.92 1.21 (8) 0.21 1.33 0.14 (9) 0.02 0.25
9 Business 0.12 (11) 0.02 0.08 0.32 (10) 0.06 0.35 -0.21 (10) -0.04 -0.37
10 Peace of mind 20.84 (3) 3.71 14.18 10.19 (2) 1.81 11.24 10.65 (3) 1.90 18.92
11 Bequest 1.07 (10) 0.19 0.72 0.22 (11) 0.04 0.24 0.84 (8) 0.15 1.50
12 Other 5.17 0.92 3.52 10.39 1.85 11.46 -5.23 -0.93 -9.29
Total 146.97 26.15 100.00 90.68 16.14 100.00 56.28 10.02 100.00
(continued)
(1)




of dissaving for each
motive of all
households (in units




of net saving for each
motive of all
households (in units
of dollars or 10,000
yen)
The average amount
of gross saving for
each motive of all
households (in units
of dollars or 10,000
yen)
motive (excluding "other").
Notes: Gross saving is the sum of gross saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets and gross saving in the form of loan repayments, while dissaving is the sum of
dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets, dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt, and dissaving in the form of depreciation on owner-occupied housing
(but excluding dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form of newly incurred debt for the housing motive).  Net saving was calculated as
gross saving minus dissaving.  The gross saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets and that in the form of loan repayments for the living expenses motive of those
of all ages, the dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets for the living expenses motive of those aged 59 or younger, and the dissaving in the form of newly
incurred debt for the living expenses motive of those of all ages were regarded as being for the peace of mind motive, while the dissaving in the form of the decumulation of
financial assets for the living expenses motive of those aged 60 or older was regarded as being for the retirement motive.  The figures in parentheses denote the rank of each
Table 6 (continued)
Data source: Tables 1-5.
1. The proportion of respondents who have received
bequests in the past (%) 28.67 22.35
2. The average current market value of bequests received
(the average for respondents who have received bequests
in the past) (in units of dollars or yen) $74,756 ¥54,114,240
3. 2 as a multiple of average annual household disposable
income (times) 2.131 9.630
4. The average current market value of bequests received
(the average for all respondents) (in units of dollars or $21,431 ¥12,094,555
5. 4 as a multiple of average annual household disposable
income (times) 0.611 2.152
6. The average annual household disposable income of all
respondents (in units of dollars or yen) $35,088 ¥5,619,294
7. The proportion of respondents who expect to receive
bequests in the future (%) 28.40 22.10
8. The proportion of respondents who have received
bequests in the past and/or who expect to receive
bequests in the future (%) 48.88 40.18
The number of respondents 1479 1217
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Table 7: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Importance of Bequests
United States Japan
Notes: Respondents not replying to the question about whether they have received bequests received in the past and/or to the
question about whether they expect to receive bequests in the future were excluded from the sample when calculating the
proportions in lines 1, 7, and 8.
Attitude toward bequests
1. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest regardless of
whether my child or children look after me after I retire 42.60 19.29
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as long as
my child or children look after me after I retire 3.32 6.43
1+2. I want to make efforts to leave behind  a bequest
(regrouped) 45.92 25.72
3. I will not make any particular efforts to leave behind a
bequest but will leave to my child or children whatever assets
happen to be left over 51.14 70.10
4. I will not leave any bequest at all to my child or children 2.94 4.18
Total 100.00 100.00
Number of respondents 1054 933
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Notes: Respondents with no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, those replying "I
don't know, I have never thought about it" or not replying to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample
when computing these proportions.
Japan
The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
Table 8: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Bequest Motives
United States
Attitude toward bequest division
1. It will be divided equally among my children 96.28 48.74
2. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children with
the least income 0.55 2.36
3. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children who
look after me 2.48 32.38
4. Most or all of it will be willed to the child or children who
carry on my business 0.00 6.91
5. Most or all of it will be willed to my oldest son/daughter
regardless of whether he/she looks after me 0.41 7.59
6. Other 0.28 2.02
Total 100.00 100.00
Number of respondents 725 593
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Notes: Respondents with one or no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children and/or to the
question about how many children they have, those replying "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the
question about bequest motives and/or to the question about the division of their bequest, and those replying "I will not leave any
bequest to my child or children" in response to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample when calculating
these proportions.
Table 9: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Attitudes toward Bequest Division
The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
United States Japan
Type of asset
Land/housing 17.28 78.12 83.82
Financial assets 21.58 80.52 84.42
Other 15.68 54.65 57.84
Total 32.67 96.60 100.00
Number of respondents 1001
Land/housing 37.35 51.86 79.87
Financial assets 5.96 54.78 57.26
Other 3.37 15.52 17.89
Total 39.71 83.35 100.00
Number of respondents 889
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Notes: Respondents who have no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, those
replying "I do not plan to leave a bequest to my child or children" or "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the
question about bequest motives, and those not replying to the question about the composition of their bequests were excluded from
the sample when calculating these proportions.
The proportion of
respondents who plan to
bequeath assets they inherited
(%)
The proportion of respondents
who plan to bequeath assets
they acquired on their own (%)
Table 10: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Composition of Bequests
The proportion of respondents who
plan to bequeath assets they inherited




1. I want to make efforts to leave behind a
bequest regardless of whether my child or
children look after me after I retire 49.43 35.18 25.72 14.14
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a
bequest as long as my child or children look
after me after I retire 3.60 3.16 6.73 6.37
3. I will not make any particular efforts to
leave behind a bequest but will leave to my
child or children whatever assets happen to
be left over 45.45 57.11 66.35 72.71
4. I will not leave any bequest at all to my
child or children 1.52 4.55 1.20 6.77
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of respondents 528 506 416 502
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Table 11: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Distribution of Respondents by Bequest Motive, Broken
Down by Whether or Not They Have Received and/or Expect to Receive Bequests
Notes: Respondents with no children, those not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, and those replying "I
don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the question about bequest motives were excluded from the sample when
calculating these proportions.  Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents not replying to the question about whether or not
they have received bequests in the past and/or to the question about whether or not they expect to receive bequests in the future.
Respondents who
have neither received












nor expect to receive
bequests
The proportion of respondents holding each view (%)
United States Japan
Subsample
Respondents who expect to receive a bequest in
the future 7.02 (228) 24.61 (191)
Respondents who do not expect to receive any
bequests in the future 6.75 (326) 18.79 (346)
All respondents (excluding those who did not
reply to the question about whether or not they
expect to receive bequests in the future) 6.86 (554) 20.86 (537)
All respondents 6.80 (559) 20.82 (538)
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Table 12: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Parental Coresidence Rates by Bequest Expectations
Notes: These figures show the proportion of respondents aged 49 years or younger who live with one or more parents or parents-in-
law.  Respondents not replying to the question about whether or not they live with their parents or parents-in-law were excluded
from the sample when calculating these proportions.  Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents not replying to the
question about whether or not they expect to receive bequests in the future.  The figures in parentheses show the number of
respondents.
Parental coresidence rate (%)
JapanUnited States
Attitude toward bequests
1. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest
regardless of whether my child or children look after
me after I retire 7.53 (146) 63.46 (52)
2. I want to make efforts to leave behind a bequest as
long as my child or children look after me after I
retire 6.67 (15) 63.89 (36)
3. I will not make any particular efforts to leave
behind a bequest but will leave to my child or
children whatever assets happen to be left over 12.02 (208) 49.45 (182)
4. I will not leave any bequest to my child or
children 7.69 (13) 25.00 (16)
All respondents (excluding those who replied "I don't
know, I've never thought about it" or who did not
reply to the question about bequest motives) 9.95 (382) 52.45 (286)
All respondents 10.05 (398) 49.70 (334)
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Table 13: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Child Coresidence Rates by Bequest Motive
Notes: These figures show the proportion of respondents aged 60 or older who live with one or more of their children.  Respondents
with no children, respondents not replying to the question about whether or not they have children, and respondents not replying to the
question about whether or not they live with their children were excluded from the sample when calculating these proportions.
Moreover, the results are not shown for respondents replying "I don't know, I've never thought about it" or not replying to the question
about bequest motives.  The figures in parentheses show the number of respondents.
Child coresidence rate (%)
United States Japan
Note: The precautionary motive represents the sum of the illness and peace of mind motives.
Data source: Table 6.


































U.S. 30.84 27.93 -0.14 2.87 14.6 4.2 6.35 6.4 2.59 5.04 -0.66
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